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Abstract
Capital cities that are not the economic centers of their nations – so-called
secondary capital cities (SSCs) – tend to be overlooked in the field of
political science. Consequentially, there is a lack of research and resulting
theory describing their local economy and their public policies. This paper
analyzes how SCCs try to develop and position themselves through the
formulation of locational policies. By linking three different theoretical
strands – the Regional Innovation System (RIS) approach, the concept
of locational policies, and the regime perspective – this paper aims for
constructing a framework to study the economic and political dynamics in
SCCs.
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1 Introduction
SCCs face a multitude of challenges in an intensified urban competition.
Globalization scholars argue that capital cities in general, but even more
so these SSCs, have lost importance and that global cities are much more
critical to the functioning of the global economy because as nodal points
they coordinate and control capital flows (e.g. Friedmann, 1986; Sassen,
1991; Taylor, 2004). Similarly, rescaling theories imply that along with
the up-scaling and down-scaling of state functions in global capitalism,
SCCs disappeared form the central locus and have to arrange themselves
in the periphery of global economy (e.g. Brenner, 1999, 2004; Scott, 2001).
And yet, the recent economic crisis revealed that capital cities still play an
important role because global capital flows are regulated within the con-
text and institutions of nation states (Rodrik, 2011) that are for the most
part located in capital cities. Important decisions about rescuing banks
or bailing out industrial firms were not taken in New York City, Zu¨rich or
Detroit, but in Washington DC or Bern. In short, SCCs are economically
inferior but politically superior.
Given the marginalized position of SCCs and their lack of international
charisma, SCCs as a category have not been studied yet. Zimmermann
(2010, 764) highlights the relevance of in-depth empirical research about
SCCs because it should be possible to spate the effects of the capital city
function from other factors which make up the political economy of pri-
mary capital cities. Furthermore, research about SCCs would shed light on
a specific category of cities what would help to bring some order into the
heterogenic discipline of urban studies (Brenner & Schmid, 2014, 18). Un-
derstanding how SCCs function and what role they play in a global era –
particularly as national economies struggle during this time of global crisis
– would deepening our knowledge about how global factors shape the local.
Capital cities feature a specific urban economy distinguishable by a pro-
found state presence. Their specialized economy may function as knowl-
edge economies which can constitute a so-called Regional Innovation Sys-
tem (RIS) (Asheim et al., 2011; To¨dtling & Trippl, 2011). As the RIS
in SCCs have specialized, they have been increasingly subject to urban
competition like any other metropolitan area. Therefore, policy-makers
in SCCs formulate locational policies specifically customized for the needs
of their local economy. Locational policies are place-specific and path-
dependent development strategies that aim for local innovation, within
city-region coordination and towards proactively positioning the city in
national urban networks. As a consequence, the traditional view of the
capital city as the reliable host city of the nation state, which was mired
in a comfortable dependency of the very state it was hosting, may not
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hold up anymore. This paper aims to explain how the formulation of such
locational policies in SCCs could be theoretically approached what will
help us to understand the development potential of SCCs.
With a theory building approach, this paper tries to construct an inter-
disciplinary framework. The interplay between local development initia-
tives and positioning strategies is at the core of the framework. Given
the dynamics of this interplay, the framework should allow for agency of
the local policy-makers and for place-bound responses to global pressures
rather than offering a solely functional perspective and/or economic de-
terministic view. The research questions that the framework should help
to assess are the following:
I What kind of locational policies do SCCs formulate and why are they
formulated?
II How and by which actors are those locational policies formulated in
SCCs?
III How do locational policies of SCCs interact with each other?
This paper is structured by the following outline. First, an illustrative
part discusses the economic and population dynamics of Washington DC
and Bern. The discussion of these two SCCs should provide us with empir-
ical insights how we can theoretically grasp the formulation of locational
policies in SCCs. Section 3 discusses the specificities of a RIS in a SCC
alongside its potential development and diversification. The next section
introduces the concept of locational policies. In the next step, a simple
categorization scheme brings in some order in the concept of locational
policies. Section 5 links the RIS approach with locational policies by ap-
plying a regime perspective on the policy-making process. The conclusive
part tries to merge these three different theoretical strands into a dynamic
framework which should help us to understand the formulation of loca-
tional policies in SCCs.
2 The dynamics in the political economy of
SCCs
The empirical part of this paper is a discussion of the economic and popu-
lation dynamics in Washington DC and Bern. Since this research project
is in its initial phase, the empirical part is a review of secondary literature
and documents instead of personally collected data. Thus, the empirical
part serves mainly as an illustration of current challenges that SCCs have
to face what should help in the theory building process of this paper.
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2.1 Washington DC
The metropolitan area of Washington DC spans over three states (Mary-
land, Virginia andWest Virginia) as well as the federal District of Columbia
(DoC) as its center. The whole metropolitan area displays an impressive
history of economic development based on its capital city status. Con-
structed in the swaps of the Potomac River it is now the fifth largest re-
gional economy of the United States (Greater Washington Initiative, 2010,
4). It all started with policies which enabled learning and interaction be-
tween public units and private firms. Additionally, the DoC has started
to engage in endeavors to attract middle and high-income residents into
its neighborhoods.
To a large extent, the economy of the metropolitan area Washington DC
is characterized by the US federal government and dominated by govern-
ment employment (Feldman, 2001, 866; Mayer, 2013). In 1970, around
two-thirds of the local economy was directly or indirectly dependent on
federal expenditures whereas half of the labor force was employed in the
government sector (Feldman, 2001, 866). Federal employment is typically
described as stabilizing and predictable in economic crises as well as in
times of economic boom. Despite this static effect, Feldman (2001) shows
in her article how the federal sector was decisive in creating a fully function-
ing entrepreneurial environment in the metropolitan area of Washington
DC. Triggered through public procurement, outsourcing of federal services
and knowledge spillovers from the public to the private sector, innovative
clusters developed which focused on the Internet and biotechnology (Feld-
man, 2001; Ceruzzi, 2008). As an example, the early technologies on which
the internet is based emerged from research activities of the US Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD). Researchers who have left the DOD and the
military services constitute the early entrepreneurs in the information and
communication technologies industry (ICT) whereas universities were ab-
sent from these early developments. Similarly, government agencies were
the most important sources for human talents in the early Biotech indus-
try (Feldman, 2001, 871).
During the Carter Administration (1977 – 1981), a radical diminishing
of the capital city employment size together with federal outsourcing oc-
curred what was both motivated through upcoming New Public Manage-
ment theories. Together with US policy initiatives that favored small and
technology-intense start-ups this created a fruitful environment for new
firm formations. Feldman (2001, 877 – 879) highlights that several Acts
in the 1980s provided the legal foundation of an increased dissemination
of technology and knowledge between the public and the private sector.
This dissemination was achieved through partnership opportunities for
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start-ups with public research agencies and licensing possibilities of intel-
lectual properties produced in federally funded research agencies. Since
9/11 Washington DC experienced the rapid growth of another cluster this
time triggered by the Department of Homeland Security. Private expertise
is needed in the knowledge intensive counter-terrorism machinery which
is mostly based on cyber security and cyber intelligence. Private firms
in this sector rely on high-qualified employees and spatial proximity to
decision-makers in the departments around Washington DC (Mayer, 2013,
140).
The Economic Value Added (EVA) of Washington DC is until now based
on the interaction between the administration and the private sectors
(Mayer, 2013). In these industries, this interaction has set an impulse
that has become independent in the course. The Greater Washington
Initiative (2010) observed between 1980 and 2008 a consisted rise in total
overall federal spending from $32 billion to $166 billion. ”Federal spending
on services represented almost three-quarters of the $75.6 billion in total
federal procurement in Greater Washington in 2009” (Greater Washington
Initiative, 2010, 24). An older study of Fuller (2002) calculated that every
dollar contracted out by the federal administration to firms in the region
of Washington DC generates an EVA of $1.80 for the region. For 2002
the EVA that can be directly linked to public procurement contributed to
21% of the regional GDP. The metropolitan area of Washington DC also
profited from the presence of the government during the recent economic
crisis: ”The District of Columbia benefited, along with the region’s sub-
urbs, from a relatively healthy economy in the second half of the decade.
While the Washington DC metropolitan area lost jobs along with the rest
of the country during the recession, the losses were smaller and the econ-
omy rebounded relatively quickly as a result of the federal government
presence” (Sturtevant, 2013, 7).
In sum, it seems that several acts together with the availability of high-
skilled professionals were initially decisive for the vibrant entrepreneurial
environment in the metropolitan area of Washington DC. Additionally, the
US self-conception as the global super power, the presence of important
institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
and the huge amount of money spent in public procurement led to the
place-bound development of specific clusters in the US capital. Whereas
this creation of an entrepreneurial environment has certainly different and
complex causes, a more definite causality can be traced in the formulation
of the DoC’s strategy to cope with its negative population dynamic.
The DoC is comprised out of 588’000 inhabitants whereas the Washington
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DC metropolitan area has a population of over 5 million people. Thus, the
DoC only accounts for about 10% of the population. The suburbs beyond
the limits of the district are to large parts under the jurisdiction of Virginia
and to a smaller extend under the jurisdiction of Maryland (Ghandi et al.,
2009, 268). Between 1970 and 2000, the DoC lost about a quarter of its
population while the suburban population doubled. Population losses were
most drastic among middle-class families with children (O’Cleireacain &
Rivlin, 2001, 3). Typically for a metropolis, the city is the employment
center of the wide metropolitan area. The shrinking center phenomena
consequentially increases commuting into DoC. The weekday population
roughly doubles as the result of suburban residents commuting to the city
for employment. Although these workers contribute to the city’s finance in
the form of sales taxes on any retail purchases and chargeable services they
make in the city, their income earned in the city escapes the taxation of
the DoC and vanishes into their residence states (Ghandi et al., 2009, 286).
By referring to the ”Envisioning a Future Washington” report (O’Cleireacain
& Rivlin, 2001), the administration under mayor Anthony Williams made
in 2003 ”attracting 100’000 new residents to the District of Columbia over
10 years one of his primary goals” (Sturtevant, 2013, 5). The report stated
that the population loss should be stopped and named middle-income and
high-income new residents, single as well as families, as the key factor
for an economic growth of the DoC. Based on bare figures, this strat-
egy was an enormous success. Although the ambitious goal of 100’000
new residents has been clearly missed, the Mayor Williams administration
achieved a remarkable turnaround in the population dynamics of the DoC
which lost residents ever since 1950. Between 2000 and 2010, the DoC
displayed a population surplus of nearly 30’000 people (5.2% population
growth). ”The year 2006 marked the beginning of the domestic migration
turnaround, and about 900 more households moved into the District than
moved out in that year. (. . . ) The trend accelerated in the final years of
the decade so that, between 2009 and 2010, nearly 5’000 more households
moved into the city than moved out” (Sturtevant, 2013, 6). The mo-
mentum turned against the suburbs and in favor of the DoC. It was now
attractive for young, well-educated and mostly federal-employed workforce
to reside in the district. The socioeconomic characteristics of new residents
suggest that targeting of certain populations may have worked in the case
of Washington DC (Sturtevant, 2013, 22).
The original strategy of the DoC was to attract, besides middle- and upper-
income singles, families and couples because they display less fluctuation
in their residential behavior. However, local action suggested something
else: ”While attention was paid to the District of Columbia public school
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system through the appointment of a new schools chancellor and other
efforts, the city leadership’s focus was increasingly directed toward creat-
ing an environment that was attractive to young, childless, and relatively
wealthy households”(Sturtevant, 2013, 5). The economic vitality of the
DoC, however, depends on a relatively sustainable population. At the mo-
ment, 44% of the DoC’s households are single person households what is a
significant gap compared to 26.7% nationally (Tregoning, 2013, 312). This
implies that the District’s new residents may not be long-term residents
(Sturtevant, 2013, 22). When singles become parents, they tend to move
out of the DoC. Accordingly, the next challenge for the DoC may be to
focus its locational policies on generating an attractive environment for
families.
As the first insight of this discussion on can observe that the capital city
function has the potential to create an unique entrepreneurial environment
through intelligent policy-making. Secondly, to focus solely on luring firms
into its region may not be enough. It is important to simultaneously posi-
tion itself towards potential income taxes what are the other main source
of money accumulation. With a 30 year lag, this development was far
from simultaneous in the DoC. This may be the second important lesson
to learn from the DoC experience.
2.2 Bern
Overall, Bern is profiting from its status as the capital city. The pres-
ence of the federal administration generates development effects for the
whole city-region (Mayer, 2013, 143). A study of 2004 (Ecoplan, 2004)
calculates that the the capital city status accounts for an EVA of CHF
375 million for the city economy and CHF 305 million for the cantonal
economy. It furthermore has produced around 4700 jobs in the city and
3900 jobs in the canton of Bern. However, the economic dynamics in Bern
are far form entrepreneurial. Quite contrary, the often cited 85-100-120
formula highlights that Bern displays just 85% of the average economic
strength of Switzerland, provides for 100% of the average public services
and consequently features a tax burden of 120%.
In a comparative study of external city affairs, van der Heiden (2010, 173)
highlights that Bern is dependent on the national administration. As a
consequence ”good relations with the national scale are seen as highly
important for the economic well-being of the city region, whereas inter-
national contacts are seen as much less important in economic terms”.
Consequently, Bern aims for a strong position towards the nation state.
However, relying on good relationships with the federal level did not suffice
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in times of growing economic importance of metropolitan areas and limited
public resources. In 2008, the federal government presented its national
future land use strategy, in which three metropolitan areas were defined as
core areas, namely Zurich, Basel and the Le´manique pole (Geneva/Lau-
sanne), while Bern and vicinity were considered of lower importance as a
mere urban network. This represented a downgrade with tangible impli-
cations in terms that Bern may be second priority in future infrastructure
funding decisions by the federal government. The city-region of Bern re-
acted to this disadvantageous federal policy shift by labeling itself as the
political center of the nation and as such differentiating itself to the eco-
nomically strong metropolitan areas. End of 2010 and within just one year
of planning, the region adopted the label Capital City Region Switzerland
(CCRS) arguing that the capital should not to be measured by economic
success only, but by its function as the place where the political decisions
were made and implemented, which in turn helps other metropolitan areas
to prosper.
Since the funding of infrastructure project, mainly the expansion of the
train station, is of major concern to Bern, a Madisonian line of argument
was often pursued.1 It means that a capital should guarantee equal access
to the seat of government for all citizens (Engstrom et al., 2013, 225).
Translated to this day and age, this argumentation claims a higher signif-
icance of capital city regions by awarding funds for public transport and
mobility projects. This kind of argumentation strategy of Bern worked
out insofar as in the revised land-use planning strategy, Bern has been
placed back in the top tier of metropolitan areas albeit with addendum
of its function as the political center. The implemented land-use strategy
now consists out of an odd 3 + 1 core areas formula. Whereas Bern profits
from the first-tier benefits, it merely functions as an annex to the three
metropolitan centers. Bern managed to position itself with a political
strategy. However, this was more an act of crisis management than a sus-
tainable development strategy. Bern should avoid to solely rely constantly
on the static label of a capital city by starting to establish a functional RIS
(Mayer & Sager, 2012). Such a process is now in its initial phase by iden-
tifying potential promising sectors. High-tech firms and the Knowledge
Intensive Business Sector (KIBS) already display some economic dynam-
ics and cluster building in the region what offers the potential for a specific
entrepreneurial environment. However, a cluster strategy is not identifi-
able yet.
1 James Madison, co-author of the seminal ’Federalist Papers’ (Hamilton, Madison, and
Jay 2005) and fourth President of the United States (1809-1817), formulated a theory of
representation arguing that the republican principle of ’equal right’ should matter when
determining the location of the capital.
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The population dynamics of Bern are worrisome. Commuting is a major
issue for Bern (Ecoplan, 2004; Ku¨bler, 2009; Hermann, 2013). Out of 56
Swiss agglomerations, Bern is the third weakest in respect to population
growth (Hermann, 2013). Hermann (2013) argues that instead of treating
Bern’s economy as the major weak spot, the decision-makers should fo-
cus on the population decline based on conservative land-use designation
rules. Whereas Bern experience a slow job growth, the absent popula-
tion growth causes a drain of tax capital. Quite controversially, Hermann
(2013) localizes a general skepticism towards growth based on an ecological
conservatism. In his eyes, this is a self-delusion since this strategy fosters
increased mobility into the agglomeration of Bern what is not ecological at
all. If one shares this diagnosis, Bern finds itself in a paradoxical situation
in which the city’s skepticism towards growth exports tax revenues but
imports ecological problems. In the future, commuting into Bern is likely
to increase further because there are almost no reserves of building land
in the agglomeration of Bern.
In sum, Bern should focus on more positive dynamics in regard of at-
tracting firms and residents. However, it is not as simple as policy-
makers in Bern could just draft such attracting money strategies. The
entrepreneurial environment an the residential attractiveness of Bern has
to be visible to outsiders in order that such strategies are credible. At this
current stage, Bern may be well advised if they focus on internal policies
that foster the attractiveness for firms and residents while externally still
focusing on their functional importance as the capital city.
Comparing Washington DC with Bern obviously bears some risks. The
size of the country and the population size of the two metropolitan areas
are quite different. Mostly due to Switzerland’s small scale, the capital city
functions are polycentric distributed over the whole country (Mayer, 2013,
147). Additionally, the peculiarity of the military-technological complex
is important in the context of the US. However, the two countries share
some important institutional similarities like federalism, fiscal indepen-
dency and the importance of local autonomy. Due to their belonging to
the category of SCCs, they are both secondary economic regions in their
countries and missing an industrial tradition. The starting point of this
paper – to use its political superiority to get rid of the economic inferior-
ity – is the same for both capital cities. It makes them both dependent
on the interaction between the private sector and the federal institutions.
Especially the KIBS produce specific services that the political center of
a nation creates a market for. Also in regard to the population dynam-
ics both cities are comparable. Capital cities in general are more prone
to experience a ’crowding out effect’ than other cities are (Ku¨bler, 2009).
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High property costs can lead to an intensified commuting into the core
city. The commuting tendency into secondary capital cities is furthermore
stimulated by the tendency of federalist states to locate its capital between
different regions within a country (Slack & Chattopadhyay, 2009). This
consequentially facilitates the commuting over fiscal borders. A large scale
commuting into SCC’s, as analyses of Bern (Ecoplan, 2004; Ku¨bler, 2009;
Hermann, 2013) and Washington DC (Ghandi et al., 2009; Sturtevant,
2013) highlight, lead to a loss of substantial tax substrates.
The conclusions of this empirical part are twofold. First, it suggests that
a SCC’s should employ strategies to attract mobile capital and not solely
relying on their political and functional importance as the capital city.
Secondly, both cases emphasize that within such attracting money strate-
gies, SCCs should not only concentrate on the regional economy but as
well on the residential attractiveness of the city-region. In the theoret-
ical part of this paper, these empirical insights will be processed into a
framework of locational policies for SCC’s. This framework relies mainly
on three theories. First, the RIS literature approaches the local economy
by focusing on the exchange of ideas, knowledge and innovation what is
fruitful in analyzing the interplay between the federal administration and
the KIBS as contractors. Secondly, a categorization of locational policies
will help us to distinguish different forms of local development strategies
that SCC’s potentially adopt. Thirdly, the regime perspective on policy-
making links the RIS approach with categories of locational policies by
offering an analytical lens on policy formulation in city-region.
3 Regional Innovation Systems
The RIS approach emerged out of economic geography. It helps to describe
the development, the diversification and the interdependencies of regional
economies. According to Doloreux & Parto (2005, 134), a RIS is ”typically
understood to be a set of interacting private and public interests, formal
institutions, and other organizations that function according to organiza-
tional and institutional arrangements and relationships conducive to the
generation, use, and dissemination of knowledge”. Departing from this
definition, capital cities should display a distinctive type of RIS.2
2 Although the literature distinguishes between different types of RIS, characteristics of
capital cities are not taken into account. The economic geography part of our research
project about SCC’s tries to fill this scientific gap.
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3.1 Development and diversification of a Regional In-
novation System
Based on the theory of comparative advantage (Ricardo’s theorem), the
smart specialization concept argues that regional growth and development
is related to the ability of a region to focus on its competitive advan-
tages. McCann & Ortega-Argile´s (2011, 2), for example, note ”that re-
gions will be required to identify the sectors, the technological domains,
or the major arenas of likely competitive advantage, and then focus their
regional policies so as to promote innovation in these fields”. Applying
the smart specialization concept to the specific RIS of a SCC (SCC-RIS),
the entrepreneurial development depends on the ability to link the re-
gional economy to the capital city function and further diversify their
regional economy. Diversification is a path-dependent process which is
based on the preexisting technological portfolio of a region. The extent
to what a SCC-RIS has smart specialized and thus have developed as an
entrepreneurial environment, differs highly among SCCs. By conceptualiz-
ing the interaction between public and private actors as the crucial driver
for diversification, between three development stages of a SCC-RIS can be
distinguished3.
In an early stage, the CC-RIS is barely linked to federal organizations.
The process of sectoral cluster formation starts to take place. However,
the development of local clusters and the capital city functions can better
be described as running parallel rather than interacting and complement-
ing each other. So, the presence of federal organizations is not seen as a
major opportunity to be grasped for cluster development. From the per-
spective of the administration, the solution of specific problems requires
external knowledge and expertise. However, this type of interaction does
not create spillovers into the private sector beyond this sparsely contacts.
Bern would be an example that is now starting to leave this stage for the
next one.
In an advanced stage, the ability to make use of the capital city function
for the benefit of economic growth has increased. Spatial proximity be-
tween firms and public organizations has been actively used to strengthen
strategic advantages. This occurred by connecting technological fields of
competences to public organizations within the same field. The advantages
are twofold: Firstly, by focusing entrepreneurial activities on government
needs, firms increased their ability to attract government contracts. These
companies have an excellent understanding of the public sector, meaning
3 However, such a development is by no means linear in nature. Spigel (2011) uses Ottawa
as an example to demonstrate how capital regions can be thrown back due to external
shocks.
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that they understand how to translate between public-administrative and
economic rationales. Secondly, firms gain knowledge generated from the
procurement process which are than dual used for customers other than
the State. In an advanced stage, such spillovers from public private inter-
action to a solely private market are likely to increase.
In a mature stage, public procurement has contributed in many ways to
establish a knowledge-based economic diversity. On the one hand, the
knowledge economy is smart specialized, in the sense that the capital city
functions are used to generate competitive advantages in the region. The
private-public interaction works as a driver for innovation activities within
certain fields of competences. On the other hand, the promoted areas of
technological competences are highly diversified. New technological ideas,
realized via start-ups or existing firms, have been added to the existing
knowledge base. Even though the demand generated by public institu-
tions is distributed across all sectors, one or two sectors that dominate
the innovation system have emerged. For instance, in Washington DC,
there is a concentration of innovation activities focusing on the Internet,
biotechnology as well as security (Feldman, 2001; Ceruzzi, 2008; Mayer,
2013). In these industries, the interaction between the public and private
sector has set an impulse that has become independent in the course.
4 Locational policies
The suggested ordering of different stages for a SCC-RIS consequentially
rises the question how such a development of a SCC-RIS can be achieved.
The RIS literature does not highlight kinds of steering mechanisms that
policy-makers could adopt in order to foster an entrepreneurial environ-
ment in SCCs. The RIS approach is quite descriptive and it remains sur-
prisingly vague about potential locational policies. Public policies should
only be adopted to overcome different kinds of failures (Cooke, 2001;
Asheim et al., 2011). Private actors must fail first, in order to legiti-
mate public interventionist actions. In this regard, To¨dtling & Trippl
(2005) argue that systemic failure ought to be the foundation for policy
instruments. Since this conservative view on policy interventions is not
satisfactory, this paper turns towards public policy concepts which pro-
vide us with the more proactive category of locational policies.
The term locational policy is based on the German notion of Standort :”it
refers to a location for capital investment, and implicitly, to the structural
competitiveness of that location relative to other possible locations within
and beyond the national territory” (Brenner, 2000, 319). Enhancing eco-
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nomic competitiveness is the goal of locational policies. More precisely,
”the goal of such [locational] policies is clearly to position the city on
the global scale of capital circulation by enhancing and presenting its at-
tributes that are considered to be most competitive” (van der Heiden, 2010,
10; based on Gordon, 1999; Ohmae, 2001; Brenner, 2004). Locational poli-
cies try to further develop ”locational advantages and productive capacities
of cities and regions in their territorial jurisdictions as maximally compet-
itive nodes in the global economy” (Jessop & Sum, 2000, 2294; based on
Brenner, 1999).
In an optimistic, neo-classic view on interurban competition, it is assumed
that each city-region has the potential to identify its own competitive niche
(Porter, 1990, 1995; Leitner & Sheppard, 1999). In this theory of compara-
tive advantage (Ricardo’s theorem), regions should focus their production
on domains in which they are comparatively most competitive (Hall & Sos-
kice, 2001, 36). The creation or identification of a place-specific advantage
is stimulated in the interurban competition, because it allows escaping
from a fully competitive global market (van der Heiden & Terhorst, 2007,
342). The neo-institutional strand of the varieties of capitalism approach
emphasizes the political-institutional setting of a city-region to a greater
degree than the theory of comparative advantage. ”The basic idea of the
varieties of capitalism approach proposes a necessary coherence between
economic orientation and the political-institutional setting within a given
territory” (van der Heiden, 2010, 18 based on Streeck, 1997; Hall & Soskice,
2001). This place-specific processes lead to a monopoly of place that are
diverse given different cities, which can be conceptualized as place-specific
assets that are not easily to imitate elsewhere (Boyer, 1996, 30; Jessop,
1997, 67; Scott, 2001, 4; van der Heiden, 2010, 18). The competitive
economic pressure will lead to a further development of this comparative
advantage through place-bound and path-dependent locational policies.
”It can . . . be argued that a diversified response to globalization pressures
will occur according to the path-dependent political-economic institutional
setting of each city region” (van der Heiden, 2010, 20). Thus, urban gov-
ernance arrangements and their specific locational policies are the result
of a long-term negotiated process of structuring and governance among
and between local and central governments and private actors (Parks &
Oakerson, 2000; Savitch & Vogel, 2000, 2009).
In sum, locational policies rely on the identification, the development and
the promotion of place-specific assets. The comparative advantage is the
result of the place-bound and path-dependent interplay of the specific eco-
nomic sector-mix and the political-institutional setting of a city-region. In
the context of SCCs, the national scale of competition is crucial in which
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they can transform their singularity as the capital city into their compar-
ative advantage.
However, locational policies are not easy to identify, distinguish and cat-
egorize. Locational polices involve far more than just economic develop-
ment initiatives (Stone, 2012, 19). They appear in complex bundles and
they do not occupy a narrow span of polices. Thus, we need a framework
that helps us to analyze and disentangle this complex bundle of locational
policies. In the following, a theoretical framework of locational policies is
proposed which has four distinctive categories namely, innovation policies,
coordination and two types of positioning strategies (attracting money /
asking for money). Whereas just innovation policies directly aim at the
RIS, coordination and positioning strategies are not negligible in the pro-
cess of developing SCCs.
These policy categories are distinguished by their orientation (inward vs.
outward) and their dimension (economic vs. political) what creates an
neatly arranged 2x2 cross table. Innovation policies are inward oriented
and have an economic characteristic because they try to further develop
and diversify the SCC-RIS. Coordination displays also an inward ori-
entated characteristic but it operate on a political dimension. It aims
at strengthening coherent policy-making within city-regions. Positioning
strategies cover the outward orientated column. They try to distinguish
a city-region in relation to other city-regions by pointing at one’s spe-
cific comparative advantage. Given the proposed economic/political di-
chotomy, attracting money is concerned with luring mobile capital into
the region and with enlarging the local tax pool. Asking for money, on
the other hand, tries to justify or even increase federal money transfers by
highlighting its singularity and its functional role as the political center.
This broad framework of locational policies allows us to study how the
place-specific comparative advantages are developed (innovation policies),
promoted (positioning strategies) and how these endeavors are harmonized
within the city-region (coordination). Table 1 illustrates these four differ-
ent locational policy categories. The next four subsections discuss these
different locational policies by referring to SCCs.
4.1 Innovation policies
The economic performance of capital cities can be influenced by regional
innovation policies. According to Doloreux (2002, 248) those policies ”are
intended to improve interactions between the knowledge infrastructures,
firms, and institutions”. Along the same lines, To¨dtling & Trippl (2005)
emphasize the importance of policies for shaping innovations. More specif-
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Table 1: Locational policies categories
Orientation
Dimension Inward Outward
Economic Innovation policies Attracting money
Recipient: RIS Recipient: Firms and residents
Aim: Developing and Aim: Attracting mobile capital
diversification of the RIS and taxes
Political Coordination Asking for money
Recipient: City-region Recipient: Nation state
Aim: Coherent region, Aim: Justifying and
increasing the effectiveness of increasing federal payments
the other locational policies and money transfers
ically, they consider that innovation policies highly influences the knowl-
edge generation/diffusion and knowledge exploitation of a RIS. Empha-
sizing the spatial proximity of interactive learning actions, the RIS ap-
proach argues that innovation policies are most effective on a regional
level (Asheim & Gertler, 2005).
In a SCC-RIS innovation policies are not only derived from system fail-
ures. The state takes an active role in innovation processes as the entity
that demands products and services from private sector actors through
the public procurement process. Lazonick & Mazzucato (2013) assert that
the classic image of the state and businesses is reversed by public procure-
ment for innovation: in this case, the state is occupying the leading role in
radical innovations, and bears hefty risks. Companies, however, wait until
the risk has declined, and only enter the market at a later stage. Lazon-
ick & Mazzucato (2013, 1100) thus coin the term ’entrepreneurial state’,
which is tasked with ’opportunity creation’ for subcontractors. As another
example, Feldman (2001, 877 – 879) highlights several Acts in the 1980s
as decisive for the diversification and development of Washington DC’s
RIS. These Acts provided the legal basis of an increased dissemination
of technology and knowledge between the public and the private sector.
Partnership opportunities of start-ups with public research agencies were
created and firms ”began working for the government but then realized
that they could adapt their products for dual-use commercial markets”
(Feldman, 2001, 875).
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4.2 Coordination
Urban economies and linkages go far beyond the core city (Cheshire, 1999;
Sassen, 2001). The coordination of actors and policies in city-regions is
conditioned by the mismatch between the functional and the political
spaces in metropolitan areas (van der Heiden, 2010, 28). According to
Frederickson (1999, 706), the interdependency of jurisdiction, organiza-
tions and institutions is the densest in metropolitan areas what makes
coordination necessary and meaningful. Thus, coordination is a major
concern of metropolitan governance.
The double-logic of competition implies that a competition between re-
gions as well as a competition within a region can exist. Competition
within a city-region is a threat for the economic competitiveness in the
competition between regions. Any internal dispute over capital invest-
ment at the regional scale consequentially weakens the economic competi-
tiveness of the whole region. The worst case scenario of within competition
would be that different localities engaging in beggar-my-neighbor strate-
gies within a city-region (Keating, 1995, 20; Sager, 2002, 64 – 65; van der
Heiden, 2010, 28 – 30). However, Ku¨bler & Piliutyte (2007, 365) found
in a comparative analysis of international activities of city-regions that a
metropolitan-wide commonality of interest regarding its promotion exists.
This suggest that locational policies are among a rare numbers of urban
policies in which conflicts between core cities and suburban municipalities
are mostly absent. Thereby is effective coordination not achieved through
institutional consolidation but rather through cooperative arrangements
that stabilizes networks of policy-relevant actors (Ku¨bler & Heinelt, 2005,
10; Sager, 2006, 434). Due to its instrumental characteristic, coordination
does not ask about the essence of the pursued policies. This implies that
a policy can be implemented coherently throughout the city-region while
not achieving any welfare gains (Sager, 2002, 47). Only if coordination
is combined with innovation policies, potential welfare gains through co-
ordination become an issue because innovation policies are more effective
when pursued in a coordinated effort. Coordination should lead to policy
coherence. ”Policy coherence can be thought of as the consistency of ac-
tions in addressing a given set of policy problems” (May & Jochim, 2013,
432).
4.3 Positioning strategies
The external part of cities locational policies can be labeled as positioning
strategies. In the context of SCCs, it is important to distinguish between
two different types of positioning strategies. This distinction is crucial
because positioning strategies differ based on the recipients. Positioning
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strategies of SCCs have typically two types of recipients: the nation state
and firms/residents. This helps us to further distinguish between two
extreme poles of money accumulation strategies: transfer payments and
taxes. These differentiations lead to the proposed dualism of asking for
money and attracting money. Towards the nation state, SCCs should play
the political card whereas towards firms and/or residents SCCs should
have mostly economic arguments in hand. It is important to grasp these
two strategies not as a dichotomy that is mutually exclusive. On the
contrary, most promising is to combine these two strategies since SCCs
should position themselves towards both of the main sources of capital.
By combining these two strategies, SCCs try to escape a total dependency
of the nation state. However, employing attracting money strategies seem
to be only promising when you have a developed and therefore credible
RIS and/or a distinct and therefore credible residential attractiveness.
4.3.1 Asking for money
A state-orientated positioning strategy stresses its singularity and its func-
tional role as the political center. Intended is the justification or possi-
ble increase of federal money transfers and compensation payments for
capital city charges. We categorize such kind of strategies as asking for
money strategies. This asking for money strategy guaranties the SCCs
a protected status in the national urban competition what makes tehm
less vulnerable to economic pressure. When SCCs employ such a strat-
egy, they completely avoid the international interurban competition and
partly avoid the national interurban competition. On the national scale,
asking for money strategies argue that the capital city should not be mea-
sured by economic success only, but by its function as the place where the
political decisions are being made and implemented, which in turn help
other metropolitan areas to prosper. The most important consequence is
that asking for money is not engaging in generating additional revenue. It
does not try to convert its place-specific assets into external mobile capi-
tal from venture capitalists or firms. Asking for money strategies have a
preservative rather than a developing focus what leaves a SCC extremely
dependent on the nation state, its administration and its employees. Thus,
such a positioning is state-dependent and rather static.
4.3.2 Attracting money
The second recipients of positioning strategies are firms and/or mobile
capital. Again, the basic idea is using the singularity of capital cities in
the national urban system. But attracting money strategies try to lure
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investments, mobile capital and firms into a SCC-region. From an en-
trepreneurial perspective, the interaction of the public sector with private
sector is interesting since this is a specificity of capital cities. The com-
plex interplay and clustering of firms in political consulting, lobbying,
IT and defense and national institutions defines the knowledge-intensive
entrepreneurialism in SCCs. Attracting money strategies highlight the
entrepreneurial potential of linking the regional economy to the capital
city function. Attracting money strategies are dynamic since they aim at
enlarging the local tax revenue pool by inducing firms, workplaces and
taxpayers. They play the economic card and accept that a SCC has to
enter, at least on the national scale, interurban competition. It empha-
sizes the innovation potential of its own comparative advantage and the
entrepreneurial environment of the city-region. In that regard it is a neo-
classical strategy enriched with modern concepts from contemporary eco-
nomic geography (learning, innovation, spillovers etc.).
It is important to note, that these locational policies are not operating
isolated from each other. In the conclusion, the interdependencies of loca-
tional polices are highlighted in order to understand the dynamics behind
the development SCC-regions.
5 The missing link: Regimes
A regime perspective of urban decision-making is adopted in order to theo-
retically approach policy-making what enables us to link the RIS approach
with locational policies. The RIS-approach remains vague about local
decision-making and steering possibilities of the local economy. Locational
policies offer a framework that helps us to classify different types of local
development strategies but they do not tell us something about its formu-
lation process. Thus, it remains so far theoretically unclear how these two
concepts interact with each other. Both concepts are engaged in promot-
ing the economic attractiveness of a city-region. Local decision-making in
this area is most likely not following the formal line of authority. Business
influence within locational policies is relatively undoubted (Swyngedouw
et al., 2002). If city-officials strive for more than just routine service de-
livery, the incorporation of private actors is crucial (Stone, 1989, 183 –
184, 219). Harvey (1989, 6) depicts the role of the local government in
this interplay with business actors as merely facilitative and coordinative.
This entanglement of business actors with public institutions characterizes
the specific political economy of SCCs. In the context of locational poli-
tics in SCCs, it is therefore likely that in addition to a executive circle of
politicians, business actors have substantial influence in the policy-making
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process. The regime approach particularly allows for such a diversity of
actors in the decision-making process.
The urban regime approach has emerged through inductive theory build-
ing as one of the most prevalent frameworks for the analysis of decision-
making processes in cities. Innovative was the focus on both the eco-
nomic and political influences while allowing for embedded agency of local
decision-makers (Mossberger, 2009, 40). The strength of the urban regime
approach is the analysis of how urban decision-makers mediate structural
pressures4 (Ferman, 1996; DiGaetano & Klemanski, 1999; Mossberger &
Stoker, 2001; Davies & Imbroscio, 2009). Stone & Whelan (2011, 859 –
860) emphasize that by stressing the mediating role of regimes ”the point
is not that cities somehow function independently of external factors, but
that translocal forces are mediated through local actors in ways that are
far from trivial”. Regimes are thereby operating at the crucial point of
inquiry between independent variables and policy outcomes (Stone, 1989,
6; Mossberger & Stoker, 2001, 812). Thus, urban regimes are both the
products of, and mediating institutions between, economic and political-
institutional structuring and represent the local responses to a shifting
urban political economy (DiGaetano & Klemanski, 1999).
In an early regime approach, Stone (1989) emphasizes the importance
of informal arrangements by which public and private actors function to-
gether in order to have the capacity to govern. Urban regimes are informal
but relatively stable groups ”with access to institutional resources that en-
ables it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions” (Stone,
1989, 4). In regimes, policy-makers are conceptualizes as problem-oriented,
goal-seeking and purposeful and therefore subscribed by a strong sense of
agency (Stone, 1989, 1993; May & Jochim, 2013). In the tradition of
Stone’s urban regime theory, a recent regime framework presented by May
& Jochim (2013) conceptualizes regimes as the governing arrangements for
carrying out policies which are addressing a specific set of problems. The
authors suggest that ”rather starting with a policy, one starts with the
particular set of problems (. . . ) and seek to depict the ideas, institutional
arrangements, and interest that constitute the governing arrangements for
dealing with the problem” (May & Jochim, 2013, 5). This descriptive lens
enables a ”backward mapping of governing arrangements for a given policy
problem” (May & Jochim, 2013, 2). Since SCCs mainly focus on improv-
ing their marginalized economic position, locational policies are prone to
be formulated from a problem-oriented perspective.
4 We are not interested in deterministic predictions of the specific urban regimes types, as
Dowding et al. (1999) suggest we rather apply urban regimes as a model in order to extract
information.
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Table 2: Policy regimes a
Components and Relevance Illustrations Analytical questions
Ideas: ”Entrepreneurial capital What is the core idea?
Shared commitments concerning city environment” Is it endorsed by key actors and
policy purpose ”Residential city” by those who carry out the policies?
”The one and only capital” Has it been reinforced through
Provides the glue of a regime statements and actions of
policymakers and policy entrepreneurs?
Institutional arrangements: Coordination structures What are the institutional arrangements?
Structures of authority, between public and private What are the modes of interaction
modes of interaction, and key actors between the key actors?
organizational relationships (e.g. Capital City Region) How does the regime try
Horizontal coordination within to ensure policy coherence?
Fosters structure-induced the city-region and policy How does the regime deal with
cohesion of actors and policies coordination within competition in the city-region?
Interests: Formal authority in local What are the on-going sources
Actors preference to engage decision making of interest support of the regime?
in a regime Promoting and assertion Which actors participate with
of direct interests what kind of motivation?
Establishes the governing General interest in a Are there actors that participate
capacity of a regime strong local economy to avoid nongovernance?
a Source: Based on May & Jochim (2013, 434) with own adaptions
In contrast to Stone who describes different types of urban regimes, the
policy regime approach of May & Jochim (2013) suggests a constellation
of ”three forces that comprise a regime: ideas, institutional arrangements,
and interests” (May & Jochim, 2013, 434). Ideas matter because they
create a common understanding of a policy purpose and serve as an in-
tegrative force (May & Jochim, 2013, 435). ”Institutional arrangements
structure authority, attention, information flows, and relationships in ad-
dressing policy problems” (May & Jochim, 2013, 435). It is thereby in-
teresting through what modes of interaction and through what kind of
bodies the public private partnership is ensured. Interest helps to explain
the governing capacity of a regime (Stone, 1989, 21; Stoker, 1995, 6). ”The
bases of support are in principle derived from the affected beneficiaries.
But relevant stakeholders may or may not have the same sense of urgency
and the same degree of ’buy in’ to the purpose of a policy regime” (May
& Jochim, 2013, 436). Stone (1993, 12) stresses that actors can display
dynamic policy preferences because actors are purposive in the sense of
wanting to be involved in achievable goals. Actors in a regime are drawn
by small opportunities which ”encompass the opportunity to be purposeful
(even when the purpose is a small one) and the opportunity to accomplish
a task (even when the task is a narrow one)” (Stone, 1989, 232). This
implies that, beside that mere safeguarding of interests, the motivation to
be part of a regime can be to avoid nongovernance since nongovernance is
a form of powerlessness (Stone, 1989, 231). Alongside these three forces
we can formulate analytical questions that helps us to understand why
certain policies have been created. Table 2 is derived from May & Jochim
(2013, 434). It illustrates the three forces of a regime and displays a cor-
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responding catalog of analytical questions.
6 Conclusion: Constructing a dynamic frame-
work
In the conclusion, the three theoretical parts are merged into a framework
that should help to approach the research questions of this paper. Figure
1 illustrates the process of locational policy formulation in SCC.
Figure 1: Framework of SCCs locational policies, own illustration
The three different categories of locational polices are not operating iso-
lated from each other. In order to capture these interdependencies, one
should start with the development of the RIS in a SCC. If a RIS is devel-
oped and diversified, it offers the potential to enter the interurban compe-
tition on the national scale by referring to its entrepreneurial environment
(attracting money). If the public-private interaction has led to an en-
trepreneurial environment for firms that search the contact with federal
institutions, SCCs can credibly occupy this niche on the national level.
The same argument can be made for the residential attractiveness. Coun-
terfactual it means that no city-region can compete with the top-tier cities
by referring only to a potential RIS that has not developed yet, because
they would be wiped off by the mere economic power of the other cities.
Thus, for a less developed SCC-RIS, the only strategy left is to play the
political card and to insist on its functional role as the one and only capi-
tal city. This strategy guarantees singularity in the national urban system
and moves the focus away from its economic inferiority and towards its
political superiority. It leaves, however, a SCC in the dependency of the
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nation state with hardly any room for an intrinsic economic development.
Thus, if we leave for a moment the two other locational policies aside, we
end up with two rather static assumptions of how the RIS is influencing
positioning strategies of SCCs.
Assumption 1.1: The more a SCC-RIS is developed and diversified, the
more its positioning strategy can emphasize its specific entrepreneurial
environment (attracting money) alongside its capital city function
(asking for money).
Assumption 1.2: In a weak developed and diversified SCC-RIS, its posi-
tioning strategy can only emphasize the capital city function (asking
for money).
These two static assumptions would imply a deterministic explanation of
positioning strategies. In such a setting, policy-makers in the regime would
not be equipped with agency nor with capacity to gauge policy options.
However, positioning strategies are not the only locational polices which
policy-makers can implement. As an option, innovation polices are directly
aiming at the needs and problems arising from the SCC-RIS. Different
innovation policies can launch, initiate and stimulated the development
process of a RIS. Especially through facilitating links to federal institu-
tions, innovation polices can make use of the public sector as a driver for
the diversification and development of the SCC-RIS. Successful innova-
tion polices enables policy-makers to adopt both categories of positioning
strategies. Similarly, innovation policies that try to improve the residen-
tial attractiveness of a SCC-region are enabling the adaption of attracting
money strategies that are targeted on a certain population of tax payers.
Thus, problem-oriented policy-makers that are engaged in drafting inno-
vation policies are enabling the political and economic empowerment of
SCC-regions by allowing the adoption of credible attracting money strate-
gies. Innovation policies can lay the foundation to move a SCC’s economy
from a nation state dependency towards partial self-autonomy. Applied
on the before stated assumptions (1.1 + 1.2), successful innovation polices
have the potential to switch from assumption 1.2 to assumption 1.1.
Assumption 2: Innovation polices that enable the development of a RIS
and/or improve the residential attractiveness of a SCC-region can lay
the foundation for a process that allows a SCC to adapt attracting
money positioning strategies alongside asking for money positioning
strategies.
Coordination tries to increases the effects of innovation policies and posi-
tioning strategies. Fragmentation in the policy formulation and or imple-
mentation process has the potential to sabotage possible positive effects
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of locational policies. Therefore, coordination tries to ensure that inno-
vation policies and positioning strategies have a facilitative effect on the
region’s economic prosperity. In that combination, coordination may pro-
duce welfare gains for a SCC-region. The more a SCC is able to emanci-
pate itself form the dependence of the nation state, the more coordination
becomes crucial. Municipalities within a city-region should back the loca-
tional strategy and cooperate in the implementation process of locational
polices. This is far from easy and needs negotiation skills as well as lob-
bying because the coordination instruments (e.g. CCRS) are based on the
volunteer involvement of its member without any effective way of policy
enforcement. The creation of a specific entrepreneurial environment in a
RIS needs coordinated innovation policies and attracting money strategies
supported by the whole city-region whereas asking for money strategies
are less dependent on coordinated policy implementation.
Assumption 3: The more a SCC adopts innovation policies and attract-
ing money strategies and thereby emancipates itself from the nation
state, the more crucial becomes coordination within the city-region.
In a nutshell, the availability of different locational polices and the agency
of the regime (possibility to choose between different locational policies in-
stead of structure-induced policy-making) guarantee for a dynamic frame-
work of policy-making in SCC. This proposed framework constitute the an-
alytical foundation of the whole research project. Based on this framework
the data collection in four capital cities (Bern, Ottawa, The Hague, Wash-
ington DC) will start in Spring 2014. Following a ’most similar systems’-
design, the four cases are selected in order to ”maximize the variance of
the independent variable[s] and to minimize the variance of the control
variables” (Lijphart, 1975, 165). The data will be collected from various
sources. Statistical data, the study of different documents and interviews
with relevant actors in each city should allow to compare and contrast
how different regimes are active in the process of formulating locational
policies in SCCs.
By acknowledging the interdisciplinary characteristic of the research arena,
by the incorporation of non-state actors into the analysis, by highlighting
the simultaneity of structure and agency and by using a comparative case
study framework, this research project incorporates several fruitful points
that makes it an analysis that is both grounded in and has relevance to
contemporary urban politics (e.g. edited debate of Ward et al., 2011). It
is expected that this research will find considerable demand among policy-
makers and politicians since these regions seek to find their place within a
changing global context and need basic knowledge beyond applied research
results for their strategic decision-making.
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